Fingerprinting is a technique to add identifying marks to each copy of digital contents in order to enhance traceability to a distribution system. Collusion attacks, in which the attackers collect two or more fingerprinted copies and try to generate an untraceable copy, are considered to be a threat for the fingerprinting system. With the aim of enhancing collusion security to the fingerprinting system, several collusion secure codes, such as c-frameproof code, c-secure frameproof code and cidentifiable parent property code, have been proposed. Here, c indicates the maximum number of colluding users. However, a practical construction of the above codes is still an issue because of the tight restrictions originated from their combinatorial properties. In this paper, we introduce an evaluation of frameproof, secure frameproof, and identifiable parent property by the probability that a code has the required property. Then, we focus on random codes. For frameproof and secure frameproof properties, we estimate the average probability that random codes have the required property where the probability is taken over the random construction of codes and random construction of coalitions. For the estimation, we assume the uniform distribution of symbols of random codes and the symbols that the coalitions hold. Therefore, we clarify the adequacy of the assumptions by comparison with numerical results. The estimates and numerical results resemble, which implies the adequacy of the assumption at least in the range of the experiment.
Introduction
Fingerprinting is a technique to add identifying marks to copies of digital data for distinguishing them. It has been grabbing attentions from various industries as an effective countermeasure against wide-spreading piracy of digital contents such as music, movie, or program since the traceability of distributed contents is expected to discourage the pirates from illegally distributing their copies.
The most common realization of the fingerprinting is an adoption of digital watermarking, by which identifying marks are embedded into a content in a manner that they cannot be easily modified or removed. There is another application of the fingerprinting, called traitor tracing [2] , which is used in a broadcasting system. In the traitor tracing, broadcasted contents are encrypted and each paid-up member is assigned a decoder that internally contains decryption keys to view the contents. The internal keys are One of the technical challenges of fingerprinting is to sustain its security and reliability when the users collude and collect many fingerprinted copies (contents or decoders). This attempt, called collusion attack, enables the pirates to find some of the embedded marks in their contents by comparing them in the context of the watermarking. Likewise, in the context of the traitor tracing, it enables them to obtain several decryption keys and to try to find a combination of the keys that decrypts the broadcasted contents but does not indicate which members the keys are originally from.
Collusion secure codes enhance security against the collusion attack to the fingerprinting system. In [1] , cframeproof code is introduced to guarantee that no coalition of at most c users is able to generate a content or decoder that is assigned to an innocent user (a user who is not in the coalition). Then, c-secure frameproof code [6] is introduced with an extended property that no two disjoint coalitions consisting of at most c users can generate the same word. This property prevents the attackers from incriminating an "innocent coalition." Codes with c-identifiable parent property [3] has a property that at least a member of a coalition can be identified from a content or decoder if it is generated by a coalition of at most c users. The combinatorial properties of these codes are defined explicitly under a certain assumption on the behavior of the attackers, called marking assumption.
On the other hand, traitor tracing has collusion security from its introduction in [2] , that is, an illegally distributed decoder (set of keys) can be traced back to its origin. It has a tracing algorithm to trace at least a member of the coalition that generated the confiscated decoder as long as the coalition consists of c users. The relationship of the collusion secure codes and traitor tracing is studied in [5] in the aspect of their combinatorial properties.
Even though several other collusion secure codes are proposed [4] , [6] and the relationships among their combinatorial properties are studied [5] , [7] , there is not very much of a success on their practical constructions because of the tight restrictions originated from their combinatorial properties.
In this paper, we address a practical construction of the collusion secure codes. The basic idea is that we evaluate the collusion security with the probability if a code has certain collusion security, such as frameproof property or identifiable parent property where there are random choices of codes and/or coalitions. For example, we calculate the Copyright c 2005 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers probability that a code is capable of preventing a coalition of b users from framing an innocent user where all possible b coalitions are constructed with an equal probability. On the other hand, the original collusion security such as cframeproof code, c-secure frameproof code, and a code with c-identifiable parent property can be considered as a particular case when the probability is 1 with the certain type of distribution of the coalition (the distributions in which there are only coalitions of at most c users.) Then, depending on the requirements from the applications, we are able to lower the probability in order to obtain a practical code in information rate.
We focus on the collusion security of random codes, which can be constructed very easily. We estimate the average probability that random codes have frameproof property or secure frameproof property. For the estimation, we assume the uniform distribution of symbols of random codes and the symbols that the coalitions hold. Therefore, we clarify the adequacy of the assumptions by comparison with numerical results. The estimates and numerical results resemble which implies the adequacy of the assumption at least in the range of the experiment.
The organization of this paper is as follows: In Sect. 2, a model of the fingerprinting system under consideration is shown; Sect. 3 explains the new definitions of collusion security; In Sect. 4, we investigate the collusion security of random codes and estimate the average probability that random codes have the collusion security newly defined in Sect. 3; In Sect. 5, we compare the estimation obtained in Sect. 4 with results of a numerical experiment; In Sect. 6, we finally give conclusions.
Preliminaries
In this section, we show a model of the fingerprinting system under consideration. Also, we show the definition of the collusion attack against the system. The terminology and notation will be given as well.
Fingerprinting System
We consider a fingerprinting system in which a provider assigns and distributes a fingerprinted copy to each of n users. Upon a confiscation of an illegally distributed copy, the provider traces the origin of the copy.
In the context of the watermarking, the provider first divides the content into l segments and then embeds a mark into each segment. The mark has q possible states, simply denoted by 1, 2, ..., q, and therefore a content can be represented by an l-tuple over an alphabet Q = {1, 2, ..., q}. The provider is to choose n different l-tuples, w (1) , w (2) , ..., w (n) to assign to n users. The set F = {w (1) , w (2) , ..., w (n) }, which fully represents the assignment of the fingerprinted copies, is called an (l, n, q)code, where l, n, and q respectively indicate the code length, the number of codewords, and the size of the alphabet.
In the context of the traitor tracing, the provider first divides a session key into l divided keys, dk 1 , dk 2 , ..., dk l . The session key is a symmetric cipher key to encrypt and decrypt the broadcasted content. Then the provider makes q symmetric encryptions for each of the l divided keys. A different key is used in each encryption. We denote the jth key used to encrypt dk i by k i, j for 1
The outcome of this process, which is l × q encryptions of the divided keys, is broadcasted with the encrypted content as a header. Meantime, the provider assigns l keys to a user by choosing a key from k i,1 , k i,2 , ..., k i,q for 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Each user receives l keys, with which he can decrypt the header to get l divided keys, and therefore he can view the content. We call the set of l keys a decoder. Now, one can see that the decoder for a user u, 1 ≤ u ≤ n is represented by an l-tuple w (u) ∈ Q l as in the case of the watermarking. Also, the key assignment for n users is represented by an (l, n, q) code F = {w (1) , w (2) , ..., w (n) }. In this paper, we call an l-tuple x ∈ Q l a word. Note that a word corresponds to a content or decoder. Especially, a word w ∈ F ⊂ Q l is called a codeword and corresponds to a fingerprinted content or a fingerprinted decoder. We denote the i-th digit of a word x as x i .
Collusion Attacks
We consider attackers who collude and try to generate an untraceable content. We assume that the attackers can separate a content into segments. Therefore, they can generate a new content by gathering segments from different users. Likewise, in the traitor tracing, the attackers can collect the keys inside their decoders and generate a new decoder containing keys of different users. Now it is clear that it is convenient to consider the attack described above from the aspect of (l, n, q) codes.
Consider a fingerprinting system whose assignment corresponds to an (l, n, q) code
Note that we use the term coalition for the colluding users themselves and also for the set of their codewords for simplicity. Now we define a feasible set FeS (C) of C as follows:
One can confirm that FeS (C) is a set of all the possible words (contents or decoders) that can be generated by the coalition C. We also define a set desc(c, F) as follows:
where c is an integer satisfying 1 ≤ c ≤ n and #C indicates the cardinality of the set C. The set desc(c, F) is a set of all the possible words that can be generated by a coalition of at most c codewords. We depict the inclusive relations of the above mentioned sets in Fig. 1 . Finally we define a family par(c, x, F) as follows:
where c is an integer satisfying 1 ≤ c ≤ n and x is a word in Q l . The family par(c, x, F) is a set of all the coalitions that could have generated the word x.
Probabilistic Evaluation of Collusion Security
In this section, we explain a probabilistic evaluation of collusion security. In Sect. 3.1, we evaluate the frameproof property of an (l, n, q) code by the probability that it prevents a coalition from framing an innocent user where the probability is taken over the random construction of the coalition. In Sect. 3.2, we evaluate the secure frameproof property of an (l, n, q) code by the probability that it prevents two disjoint coalitions from framing each other where the probability is taken over the random construction of the two disjoint coalitions. In Sect. 3.3, we evaluate the identifiable parent property of an (l, n, q) by the probability that at least one of the codewords that generated a word x is identifiable where the probability is taken over the random choice of the word x.
Frameproof Property
We first show the definition of c-frameproof code shown in [1] .
Definition 1:[1]
Let F be an (l, n, q) code and c an integer
If an (l, n, q) code is a c-frameproof code, no coalition of at most c codewords can generate a codeword assigned to a user who is not in the coalition. This indicates that no innocent user is framed by a coalition of at most c users. In order to evaluate the frameproof property in a probabilistic aspect, we define the following property of the code F against a certain coalition C: Definition 2: Let F be an (l, n, q) code and C be a subset of
Now we can evaluate the code F by the probability Pr[F is frameproof against C] where C is the random variable that takes on elements of 2 F where 2 F indicates the power set of F. If F is c-frameproof code and
We also give a necessary and sufficient condition for the code F to be frameproof against C:
The code F is frameproof against C if and only if the following condition is satisfied: For an arbitrary codeword w ∈ F\C, there exists an
Proof. Suppose that for an arbitrary codeword w ∈ F\C, there exists an integer j, 1 ≤ j ≤ l satisfying w j {w
Now, suppose that F is frameproof against C. On the contrary, suppose that there exists a codeword w ∈ F\C satisfying w j ∈ {w
This contradicts the fact that F is frameproof against C. It follows that there exists no such codeword w. This proves the proposition.
Secure Frameproof Property
We show the following definition of c-secure frameproof code by Stinson, van Trung, and Wei [6] .
Definition 3:[6]
If an (l, n, q) code is a c-secure frameproof code, no two disjoint coalitions consisting of at most c codewords can generate the same word, and therefore can frame each other. An (l, n, q) code F is a c-secure frameproof code if the condition
In order to evaluate the secure frameproof property in a probabilistic aspect, we define the following property of the code F against a certain family of the two disjoint sets {C, D}:
Now we can evaluate the code F by the probability Pr[F is secure frameproof against X] where X is the random variable that takes on elements of Let X be X = {C, D}. In general, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for the code F to be secure frameproof against X.
Proposition 2:
Let F be an (l, n, q) code, C and D be two disjoint subsets of F, and X = {C, D} be a family of the two sets C and D. The code F is secure frameproof against X if and only if there exists an integer j, 1 ≤ j ≤ l that satisfies {w
Proof. Assume {w
Then, there exists at least a word x ∈ {x|x j ∈ {w
and it contradicts the fact that F is secure frameproof against X. Therefore, there exists an integer j satisfying {w
This proves the proposition.
Identifiable Parent Property
Even though an (l, n, q) code has the frameproof property, the attackers still may be able to generate a word x that does not match with any codeword and escape from being traced. Hollmann, van Lint, and Linnartz defined c-identifiable parent property code as follows: In order to evaluate the identifiable parent property in a probabilistic aspect, we define the following property of the code F against a certain word x ∈ desc(c, F): 
Collusion Security of the Random Code
We investigate collusion security of random codes in this section. In Sect. 4.1, we give a detailed explanation of random codes and how we are evaluating the collusion security of the random codes including the assumptions we make for the estimation. In Sect. 4.2, we estimate the frameproof property of the random codes. In Sect. 4.3, we estimate the secure frameproof property of the random codes.
Random Code and Its Evaluation
Let F = {w (1) , ..., w (n) } be an (l, n, q) code and F be a random variable that takes on elements F = {F ⊂ Q l |#F = n}. We say F is random code or random (l, n, q) code if the distribution of F is given as follows: Pr[F = F] = 1/ q l n for any F ∈ F . As in Sect. 2 and 3, we denote the j-th symbol of codeword w (i) by w
be a random variable indicating the symbol w (i) j . When F is random code, we assume that the distribution of w (i) j is given as follows: for any three integers i, j, k satisfying 1
Now, let C = {w (u 1 ) , ..., w (u b ) } be a subset of F. Here b is an integer satisfying 1 ≤ b ≤ n and u 1 , u 2 , ..., u b are distinct integers satisfying 1 ≤ u i ≤ n for i = 1, 2, ..., b. Also, let C be a random variable, indicating the coalition C, that takes on elements of 2 F . In Sect. 4.2 and 4.3, we evaluate the probability Pr[F is frameproof against C] where the distribution of C is as follows:
If the distribution of C is as the equation (2), Pr[F is frameproof against C] indicates the average probability that the random code F is capable of preventing a coalition of b users from framing an innocent user where every possible coalition of b users is constructed with an equal probability 1/ n b . When the distribution of C is as the equation (2), we assume that the following equation holds: for any three integers i, j, k satisfying 1
Let X be a family of two sets C and D and X be a random variable that takes on elements of {{C, D}|C, D ⊂ F, C ∩ D = ∅}. In Sect. 4.3, we evaluate the probability Pr[F is secure frameproof against X] where the distribution of X is as follows:
o t h e r w i s e .
If the distribution of X is as the equation (4), Pr[F is secure frameproof against X] indicates the average probability that the random code F is capable of preventing two disjoint coalitions, one of which consists of b users and the other consists of d users, from framing each other where every possible pair of disjoint coalitions is constructed with an equal probability 1/ n b+d b+d b . When the distribution of X is the equation (4), we assume that the following equation holds: for any three integers i, j, k satisfying 1
Remarks.
• We consider the distribution of C and D as the equations (2) and (4), respectively, since it is simple but reasonable to assume all possible coalitions of the same size are constructed with an equal probability (it is true if the random assignment of codewords to users are kept secret) while it is rather complicated to determine the distribution of two or more different sizes of coalitions.
• In the following discussions, we treat the code F = {w (1) , ..., w (n) } as if a "sequence" of n words in order to estimate the probability. For instance, two sequences [w (1) , w (2) , w (3) ..., w (n) ] and [w (2) , w (1) , w (3) ..., w (n) ] result in the same code {w (1) , ..., w (n) } but are treated as two different codes in the discussion. However, our estimation is still valid since there are exactly n! sequences for each of all (l, n, q) codes and therefore, the probability still stays the same even if F is considered as a set of n codewords.
Frameproof Property of the Random Code
For further discussion, we set a few more definitions. Firstly, we define M j for 1 ≤ j ≤ l as follows:
The set M j is a set of all the symbols on the j-th digit assigned to the members of the coalition C. If the coalition C can generate a codeword w ∈ F\C that is assigned to an innocent user, then it holds w j ∈ M j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l. Secondly 
Now, we consider that the code F is random (l, n, q) code and its subset C has the distribution as in the equation (2) . Then, we assume the equations (1) and (3) hold. Let G j be a random variable that indicates the cardinality of M j . We first derive the probability Pr[ (3), every possible vector V j occurs with the same probability. Therefore, the probability Pr[G j = m] is as follows:
Also, the expected value of G j is as follows:
In order to generate a codeword assigned to an innocent user, the coalition needs to have the same symbol as the innocent user on all l digits. Therefore, the probability that the coalition C can generate the codeword is l j=1 (G j /q) assuming that the equations (1) and (3) hold. Since there are n − b innocent users, the average probability that F is frameproof against the coalition C is as follows:
Finally, from equation (8) we have E( (10) is as follows:
Now, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1: Let F be random (l, n, q) code and C be a subset of F whose distribution is given as the equation (2). If the equations (1) and (3) hold, the average probability that the F is frameproof against C is given as follows:
Proof. The proof follows from equations (11), (9), (7), and (8).
Secure Frameproof Property of the Random Code
As proved in Proposition 2, F is secure frameproof against X if and only if there exists an integer j,
Suppose that F is random (l, n, q) code and X is a family of two disjoint subsets of F whose distribution is as the equation (4). Then we assume the equations (1),(3), and (5) hold. It follows that for 1 ≤ j ≤ l:
where M j and M j are random variables indicating M j and M j , respectively. See Appendix for the details of the above equality. Now for 1 ≤ j ≤ l, there exists an integer j satisfying M j ∩ M j = ∅, therefore, the average probability that F is secure frameproof against X is as follows:
Theorem 2: Let F be random (l, n, q) code, X be a family of two disjoint subsets of F whose cardinality is b and d, respectively. Here, b and d are integers satisfying 1
If the equations (1), (3), and (5) hold, the average probability that the F is secure frameproof against X is as follows:
Pr[F is secure frameproof against X]
Proof. The proof follows from equations (13) and (14).
Comparison with Numerical Results
We compare our theoretical estimation in Sect. 4 with numerical results. In Sect. 5.1, we generate (l, n, q) codes randomly and examine whether they are frameproof against a randomly generated coalition consisting of b users. In Sect. 5.2, we generate (l, n, q) codes randomly and examine whether they are secure frameproof against X, the set of two disjoint coalitions of b users that are randomly generated. We then compare the experimental results with the theoretical estimation.
Numerical Experiment for Frameproof Property
We examine the frameproof property of random codes by randomly generating a code and a coalition and checking whether or not the code is frameproof against the coalition.
Procedure
The following procedure,
Step (1)- (3) (2-1-1) Generate 10000 coalitions consisting of b codewords † † . (2-1-2) Examine whether the random code is frameproof against each of the 10000 coalition generated in
Step (2-1-1) and count how many coalitions the code is frameproof against. We adopt the necessary and sufficient condition of Proposition 1 for the examination. (3) Calculate the average of the counts in Step (2-1-2) and divide it by 10000 to calculate the probability that random (l, n, q) codes are frameproof against a coalition consisting of b codewords. We denote the calculated probability by P exp (l, n, q, b).
Parameters
In the traitor tracing, parameters l and q should be decided in consideration of the system overhead. The size of the header (communication cost) and the storage size of the encryption keys at the provider are proportional to l and q. Also, the number of decryptions executed to obtain a session key at each user (computational cost at each user) is proportional to l.
In the fingerprinting using the watermarking, l and q should be decided in consideration of the reliability of the underlying watermarking system. The watermarking system should reliably distinguish between q states for each of the l marks embedded in a content even if it is altered by the attackers. It is intuitive that the system becomes less reliable as l and q increase.
With the above consideration, we set the parameters for the experiment relatively low, l = 30 and q = 7.
Results
We depict the experimental results in Fig. 2 . In the figure, the horizontal axis indicates b, the size of a coalition and the vertical axis indicates the probability P exp (l, n, q, b) obtained in Step (3) of Sect. 5.1.1. In Fig. 2 , in the case of n = 10, 20, 30, 50, the probability P exp (l, n, q, b) once falls as b increases. However, it rises as b keeps increasing. This is intuitively because as b increases, the decrease of the number of innocent users n − b becomes more effective than the increase of b.
Comparison
We depict in Fig. 3 the average probability that randomly † We continued generating an integer ranging from 1 to q by using rand function in C Language until we obtained n distinct l-tuples to construct an (l, n, q) code. One can confirm that the resulting code has the same distribution as the random code we defined in Sect. 4.1 assuming the rand function outputs a random number.
† † We also used rand function in C Language for the coalition generation. We however allowed a duplication of coalitions. Fig. 2 The experimental results on the probability that randomly constructed codes are frameproof against a coalition consisting of b users. The coalition is generated by randomly choosing b codewords from the random code. Fig. 3 The theoretical estimates by Theorem 1 on the average probability that random codes are frameproof against a coalition consisting of b users.
constructed (l, n, q) codes are frameproof against a randomly constructed coalition consisting of b codewords, which is obtained by Theorem 1. The results depicted in Fig. 3 and Fig. 2 resemble especially in their characteristic increase and decrease. It can be said that our estimation result in Sect. 4 represents the general characteristic of frameproof property of random codes.
Numerical Experiment for Secure Frameproof Property
We examine the secure frameproof property of random codes by randomly generating a code and two disjoint coalitions and checking whether or not the code is secure frameproof against the pair of coalitions.
Procedure
Step (1)- (3), is independently done for each of the parameters (l, n, q) = (30, 30, 7), (100, 30, 7), (1000, 30, 7), (10000, 30, 7).
(1) Generate 100 (l, n, q) codes randomly as in Sect. 5.1.1.
(2) Do Step (2-1) for each of the 100 (l, n, q) codes generated in
Step (1). Fig. 4 The experimental results on the probability that randomly constructed codes are secure frameproof against a pair of randomly constructed disjoint coalitions of b users.
(2-1) Do
Step (2-1-1) and (2-1-2) for 2 ≤ b ≤ 15.
(2-1-1) Generate 10000 pairs of disjoint coalitions, each of which consists of b codewords.
(2-1-2) Examine whether the random code is secure frameproof against each of the 10000 coalition generated in
Step (2-1-1) and count how many pairs of coalitions the code is secure frameproof against. We adopt the necessary and sufficient condition of Proposition 2 for the examination. (3) Calculate the average of the counts in Step (2-1-2) and divide it by 10000 to calculate the probability that random (l, n, q) codes are secure frameproof against two coalition consisting of b codewords. We denote the calculated probability by P exp (l, n, q, b).
Parameters
As in Sect. 5.1.2, the parameter q is left as 7. On the other hand, we set the range of the parameter l from 30 to 10000. We believe a code length of this order is still applicable in the context of watermarking digital contents of a large size, such as high-quality movies, into which we can expect to embed a large size of data.
Results
We depict the experimental results in Fig. 4 . In the figure, the horizontal axis indicates b, the size of a pair of coalitions and the vertical axis indicates the probability P exp (l, n, q, b) obtained in Step (3) of Sect. 5.1.1.
Comparison
We depict in Fig. 5 the average probability that randomly constructed (l, n, q) codes are secure frameproof against a pair of randomly constructed coalitions consisting of b codewords, which is obtained by Theorem 2. The results depicted in Fig. 3 and Fig. 2 resemble closely. It validates the adequacy of our estimate with the assumptions in Sect. 4 at least in the range of the above discussion. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we took a probabilistic aspect on three definitions of collusion security; frameproof property, secure frameproof property, and identifiable parent property. For the frameproof and secure frameproof properties, we focus on the probability that a code is capable of preventing from framing an innocent user or framing an innocent coalition where the probability is taken over the random construction of the coalition. Then, we investigate frameproof and secure frameproof properties of random codes, which can be easily constructed. Since the construction of random codes itself is randomized, we estimated the average of the above probability. We also compare the theoretical estimates with numerical results by an experiment. Our future work is to show a necessary and sufficient condition for a code to be with cidentifiable parent property against a word x ∈ desc(c, F) and to estimate identifiable parent property of the random code. Also, evaluating the collusion security of other codes than the random code is of our interest. Finally, evaluating the probability that the random code is c-frameproof code, c-secure frameproof code, and code with c-identifiable parent property code is of our interest as well.
